Answers have been edited for length and clarity.
Searchlight: You argued before the election that “rejuvenating the U.S. nuclear capabilities could play a profound role in bringing China and Russia back to the negotiating table.” What do you mean by rejuvenating? Buildup? Modernization? What’s the difference?
Rose Gottemoeller: I was talking about the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad that was launched by President Barack Obama in 2016. It is the so-called program of record for the modernization of each leg of the triad. That included the ICBMs, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the bomber force with associated warheads. I want to stress that this is not a buildup of U.S. nuclear forces. This was a modernization to take place under the limits of the New START treaty, where the U.S. is limited to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 delivery vehicles — that is, missiles and bombers. It is a limited modernization and I think it should remain so.
Searchlight: How will modernization bring China and Russia back to the table?
Gottemoeller: This is a very grave situation. After the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Vladimir Putin and Russia, one year later, in February 2023, Putin suspended Russian participation in the New START treaty. He said Russia would continue to abide by the limits of the treaty — the 700 delivery vehicles and 1,550 warheads — but would not permit any other implementation activities to take place, such as on-site inspections, exchanges of data and exchanges of deployment information. That is, the normal verification activities that take place under the treaty. So the Russians are in violation of New START on that account. That’s a serious problem. Furthermore, Putin said to President Biden — who proposed talks without preconditions — that they wouldn’t talk until the U.S. ceased assistance to Ukraine, from both the U.S. and its NATO allies.
That has meant that the U.S. and Russia are not talking about nuclear limits or arms control or strategic stability, and it’s serious because New START goes out of force in February 2026. Unless the two countries are talking about a replacement, we will be without any treaty at that time.
The other point is that the Chinese are modernizing their nuclear forces. They have been at a very low number: 200 warheads just a few years ago. Now it’s estimated they’ve built up to 500. Our Department of Defense believes that by 2035 they will have 1,500. The U.S. could face two nuclear peers, Russia and China. That is a serious worry.
Searchlight: Why do you think it has to remain limited?
Gottemoeller: Essentially the modernization that President Obama launched is an important but limited modernization taking place under New START. The important thing about this so-called program of record is that it has to be implemented without piling on new requirements like further increasing submarines or intercontinental ballistic missiles.
And, certainly, in New Mexico, Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories know that the stresses and strains of producing new pits for warheads is a very difficult and very serious task. We need to complete this program of record before we pile on new requirements, or we will simply suffer more delays, more expense and higher costs. At the end of the day, we may wind up completely cracking or breaking the modernization program.
Searchlight: Won’t modernization just invite another arms race?
Gottemoeller: I don’t think so, as long as it is kept limited, either by an arms control treaty or budget constraints.
Searchlight: The Sentinel program is already behind schedule and over budget, and it’s known that the pits being made at Los Alamos will be used in warheads for the Sentinel. Given that, do you think the Sentinel is really critical to U.S. national security? Some people have said ICBMs are archaic, and some say, “No, we need to carry on despite the costs.”
Gottemoeller: I do understand now — and I think this deserves a new look by the incoming administration — that the Sentinel program is proving to be a heavy burden, in terms of making sure that there’s even enough real estate available in the states where intercontinental ballistic missiles are deployed, in order to build out the bases in the way they need to be built out. I think it’s worth a new look to see whether the expense and complexity of the Sentinel is worth the nuclear stability payoff.
Searchlight: Because I live in New Mexico, maybe 30 miles away from Los Alamos, I think a lot about how all this will continue to affect LANL. You mentioned the stresses of producing pits and making the quotas, but do you have any thoughts on whether the lab should only focus on pit production, as opposed to other types of missions?
Gottemoeller: Our national nuclear laboratories fulfill multiple missions. One very important mission is the so-called science-based Stockpile Stewardship. I am very supportive of it as a major mission for all our nuclear laboratories, including Los Alamos.
But there are particular missions that are unique to the lab, and one is producing plutonium pits. No one else can do that. No one has the expertise. Nobody else has the facilities and the special equipment that’s required, as well as the responsibility for sustaining the security and safety of fissile material, which must be handled very carefully. Los Alamos has a big job, but I do not believe that any particular mission should outweigh the others. Stockpile stewardship is every bit as important as pit production. Of course, the lab leadership understands that they’ve got to strike a balance.
Searchlight: As far as the program of record goes, I assume your advice to the Trump administration would be to stay on track with it?
Gottemoeller: Yes, I would advise them not to interrupt the program of record. If they end up making major new demands — like telling our laboratories to somehow expand the number of pits being produced — I think they will end up crashing the entire effort to modernize the triad. That would be bad for U.S. national security.
